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This discussion will undertake two tasks. The first task is to placeguoxue (national learning) within a contemporary global perspective,to suggest that while guoxue may be unique in the nationally defined
epistemological territory (a “Chinese” way of knowing) it claims, its claims
to epistemological particularism are anything but unique. Epistemological
nativism, or a general valorisation of ethnoepistemology, is a pervasive (if
not defining) characteristic of contemporary global modernity. 
The second task follows from this first one: what are the implications for
guoxue as a subject and method of its contemporary global context?
While epistemological nativism may be a necessary step in the recovery of
epistemologies erased by the universalistic claims of Euromodern ways of
knowing, it needs to resist reduction to a parochial marker of national
identity in a narrow, ahistorical nationalism. The articulation to other
knowledges is necessary if guoxue is to be of epistemological significance
beyond national boundaries, to contribute to broader human causes, and,
ironically, to enable a more comprehensive understanding of the national
past than through a narrow nationalism. Throughout the discussion, I will
use guoxue rather than “national learning,” as I think the Chinese term guo
suggests both more and less than the English term national, a distinction
that may be necessary to grasping different understandings of guoxue
even among its practitioners. 
Global modernity and the proliferation of
knowledges
Simply put, global modernity is modernity globalised. The consequences,
however, are anything but global unification or global homogenisation. The
political economic integration of the globe, which is usually what is under-
stood by globalisation, has been accompanied by new fragmentations as
well as the intensification of earlier ones. If I may cite a passage from a re-
cent work of mine,
The globalization of modernity needs to be comprehended not just
in the trivial sense of an originary modernity reaching out and
touching all, even those who are left out of its benefits…but more
importantly as the proliferation of claims on modernity. So-called
traditions no longer imply a contrast with modernity, as they did in
modernization discourse. Nor are they the domain of backward-
looking conservatism, except in exceptional circumstances – such
as the Taliban. They are invoked increasingly to establish claims to
alternative modernities (but only rarely to alternatives to moder-
nity). They point not to the past but, taking a detour through the
past, to an alternative future. They have even taken over from so-
cialism the task of speaking for those oppressed or cast aside by
capitalist modernity and pointing to different possibilities for the
future. (2)
At its paradigmatic simplest, modernisation discourse rendered the
modernity/ tradition binary into a zero-sum relationship: the more moder-
nity, the less tradition; the more tradition, the less modernity. Modernity
was understood in its Euro/American manifestations (or what I think is
best described as Euromodernity): scientific/technological development, a
sense of history driven by its commitment to progress, the political insti-
tutions associated with parliamentary democracy, and the social primacy
of the individual. Except for the last item, socialist modernity shared in
these basic assumptions of capitalist modernity. Modernisation, under-
stood as development towards these characteristics, would relegate tradi-
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tions to the past and, ultimately, to oblivion. Indeed, its logical conclusion
was that traditions themselves were inventions of modernity, not false but
primarily ideological in substance. Euromodernity, universalised as Moder-
nity as such, was all there was. (3)
Nevertheless, invented or not, the traditions refused to disappear. Those
who spoke for traditions were labelled conservatives, which in these cases
referred not just to a political (as in nineteenth century Europe) but also
to a cultural phenomenon; indeed there was some puzzlement that so-
called “cultural conservatives” (defenders of some native tradition or other,
and therefore obstacles to urgent tasks of “westernisation,” confounded
more often than not with modernisation) could on occasion espouse rev-
olutionary politics. The questionable assumptions of these labels aside,
there were fundamental reasons, beyond conservative persistence, why the
traditions refused to disappear. Traditions, no less the invented than the in-
herited, were crucial to the formulation of a national identity in the
process of nation-building, which was a cornerstone of modernisation.
How to deploy traditions in the definition of national identity was a prob-
lem that faced all nation-building efforts, regardless of political inclination.
The idea of tradition was burdened with a deep contradiction in a moder-
nity premised on nationalism. 
This aspect of the problem became evident in the 1960s, the decade of
national liberation movements, when notes of nativism began to pervade
voices from the political left. It is interesting, if not ironic, that the radical
left challenge should transform the terrain of discourse, which in the long
run would be of benefit to conservative causes as well in its questioning of
the hegemonic dismissal of value systems other than those of Euromoder-
nity. In this case the problem was stated explicitly as the necessity of chal-
lenging the ideologies of Eurocentrism as part of the struggle against im-
perialism. These voices sometimes found legitimation in “alternative tradi-
tions” – traditions of the people rather than the elite, as with the conser-
vatives. They sometimes invested the process of struggle itself with the
task of creating the traditions necessary to overcome imperialist hege-
mony and establish a national identity. (4) But even where they had no in-
tention of promoting the traditions espoused by conservatives, radical
struggles against hegemony opened up intellectual spaces to legitimation
and revival of ideologies, traditions, and knowledges that had been erased
or marginalised in Euromodern discourse. This development is plainly visi-
ble in the critiques of modernity, questionings of the European Enlighten-
ment, controversies over “Orientalism” that gave rise to postcolonial criti-
cism, the challenges to the disciplinary organisation of knowledge, and the
valorisation of new kinds of knowledges that challenged the domination of
science. (5) It is easily forgotten these days, because of the turn they took
after the 1980s, that these critiques of Euromodernity were products of
the 1960s, when Euro/American modernity appeared as the incubator of
imperialism, and Third World liberation movements offered alternatives
beyond the existing Cold War capitalism/ socialism binary.
The failure (or defeat) of these political movements in the course of the
1970s did not extinguish their cultural promise, but rephrased them in-
creasingly as if they were issues in cultural debate rather than in the prac-
tise of revolution, erasing important class issues in the shaping of cultural
relationships, and blurring the boundaries between elite culture and na-
tional culture in general. At the same time, more conventional “conser-
vatisms” acquired renewed prestige due to the roles they played in the po-
litical and/or economic success of several societies. Of particular impor-
tance were the Islamic revival that attended the success of the Iranian
Revolution of 1979, and the Confucian revival during the very same period
that benefited from the developmental success of authoritarian East Asian
societies that claimed cultural legacies for their success. It seems in hind-
sight that over the decade of the 1970s, cultural nationalism came to re-
place the idea of national liberation, which was not just cultural, or most
importantly so. Further impetus to the so-called “cultural turn” came from
the resurgence of religious politics in the homelands of Euromodernity,
particularly in the USA.
At the same time, the global left was transformed in the process of ac-
commodating new social voices, especially ethnic and national voices,
which increased the possibilities of a left accommodation of previously
conservative positions. As biologically inflected identity markers have
moved to the foreground of discourse (such as race, ethnicity, gender, and
even culture understood with reference to them), social categories such as
class have nearly disappeared from the language of politics. Multi-cultur-
alism makes it very difficult to repudiate any cultural claim on political
grounds. Left positionings have been confounded by the languages of post-
modernity and, subsequently, postcolonialism, which acquired currency in
the 1990s, at the same time as globalisation. While intensely sensitive to
issues of hegemony, postcolonial criticism relegates those issues to the
cultural realm, replacing the conquest of imperialism with the conquest of
Eurocentrism or Orientalism. 
As culture increasingly became a force that shaped political alignments
in the 1980s, it also contributed to a gradual blurring of the categories of
an earlier political language, especially its classification of political posi-
tions around a progressive conservative-liberal-radical continuum, which
had been premised on earlier assumptions of cultural progress and mod-
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ernisation. Indeed, as the Enlightenment vision that underlay Euromoder-
nity came under question from the inside (neoliberal critics of secular hu-
manism) and the outside (postcolonial societies that had experienced the
Enlightenment as colonisation), the result was the confounding of the very
temporalities that had endowed these terms with meaning. 
If “global multiculturalism” has been one product of these changes, its
antinomy has been the “Clash of Civilisations.” Samuel Huntington’s 1993
essay was informed by a sense of the disintegration of modernity (what I
am calling Euromodernity). The “civilisations” that now challenged “West-
ern” dominance were products of distant but not bygone pasts. They were
modern, and it was their success in modernity that now empowered their
claims on tradition (or cultural identity). The clash was between modern
societies, each with its own vision of modernity defined in terms of civili-
sational pasts. The question this situation presents is how to explain the
dynamics and significance of the simultaneous globalisation of modernity
(capitalist modernity) and the proliferating claims to uniqueness and “dif-
ference” it generates. It may be the ultimate question of what we have
come to describe as post-modernity, which I consider one aspect of a
broader global modernity.
Legacies
The global context is indispensable to grasping the revival of guoxue
since the 1990s, as well as the new challenges it faces as an intellectual
undertaking. It is interesting that the first formal calls for the revival of
guoxue in 1993 coincided with the publication of Samuel Huntington’s no-
torious “clash of civilisations” article. These calls were preceded, however,
by the Confucian revival among Chinese societies overseas, which had al-
ready had an impact on the PRC in the mid-1980s, and may have been one
of the inspirations behind Huntington’s article.
Questions concerning guoxue cannot be understood simply in terms of
the structural conditions of global modernity. While China’s placement in
global developments provides an indispensable perspective for contempo-
rary readings of guoxue, equally indispensable is the perspective of the
century-long development of guoxue, with all its ups and downs, which
continues to condition both its intellectual substance and the ideological
expectations invested in it. 
In a cogent analysis of guoxue written in the late 1990s, Cheng Gang 
(程鋼) and Cao Li (曹莉) draw on the work of scholars such as Chen Lai 
(陳來) and Chen Pingyuan (陳平原), guoxue advocates who were at the
time professors at Peking University, to suggest that the trajectory of
guoxue as a field of learning has been shaped by the dynamic interplay of
two paradigms still apparent in differences among contemporary scholars
in the understanding of guoxue, and in the intellectual, cultural, and polit-
ical functions associated with it. (6) One paradigm, which may be described
as “nativist,” is traceable to late Qing/ early Republican scholarship, of
which the foremost representative was the distinguished classical scholar
Zhang Taiyan (章太炎, 1869-1936). (7) This paradigm renders guoxue into a
means of identifying, and even representing a Chinese essence, or the na-
tional character; guoxue provides at once the locus of national identity and
a method for its analysis. The other, “cosmopolitan,” paradigm, was a prod-
uct of the May Fourth New Culture Movement (新文化運動, xin wenhua
yundong), which in its basic assumptions negated the nativist paradigm. It
was enunciated most explicitly by the liberal intellectual Hu Shi 
(胡适, 1891-1962), at the time a professor at Peking University, who
sought to establish guoxue as the critical study of the national past
through the investigative technologies of Euromodernity; guoxue is under-
stood in this case as national studies informed by modern methods, with
the past as its object. (8) The past as subject, speaking to the present, versus
the past as the suspect (疑古, yigu) object of present interrogation may be
the most important distinguishing feature of the two paradigms. It is prob-
ably safe to say that no reputable guoxue advocate believed that the past
should or could be restored, or placed it beyond question; after all, ques-
tioning the past had long been a driving force of imperial scholarship, of
which Zhang Taiyan was a foremost representative. But adherents of the
two paradigms held radically different views on whether or not the past
had anything positive to contribute to the present. 
The recognition of two such paradigms at odds with one another is re-
vealing of a broad understanding of guoxue that ranges from a belief in
its significance for perpetuating a national essence that is crucial to na-
tional existence and well-being, to one that seeks to supply it with Euro-
modern tools to eradicate and rewrite the past that produced that
essence, because it had become an obstacle to national progress. And
over its century-long existence, guoxue has gone through phases resulting
from the interplay of these two paradigms. It was indeed the nativism ac-
companying emergent national consciousness that gave rise to guoxue in
the first place, and guoxue has experienced a revival with every resur-
gence of nativism. The cosmopolitan paradigm enjoyed its greatest appeal
in the 1920s, following the New Culture Movement, itself an attack on in-
herited culture and a call to its transformation. Guoxue in the 1920s ap-
peared in a number of guises that reflected the tensions created by the
conflict of paradigms, but clearly with cosmopolitanism setting the
agenda. The 1930s under the Kuomintang government (conservative but
with revolutionary claims) was intellectually an even more complicated
period in which guoxue themes appeared within the context of sophisti-
cated questions of modernity and culture. Nevertheless, Kuomintang sup-
port helped to foreground guoxue themes in a renewed emphasis on na-
tive culture. With the Confucian revival of these years (現代新儒學, xiandai
xinruxue), guoxue possibly became more closely identified with Confu-
cianism, which once again underlined the nativist impetus that animated
guoxue. 
During World War II, the Communist Party itself shaped its priorities to
national liberation, and to that end proclaimed the necessity of “making
Marxism Chinese” (馬克思主義的中國化, makesizhuyi de zhongguohua).
Marxist historiography emphasises the social dimension of history, and any
discussion of the national past had to be placed within the categories of
social history. This shifted the grounds in the discussion of the national
past, but it would be wrong to think that concern for guoxue questions dis-
appeared altogether. In the late 1950s, PRC historians once again under-
took the discussion of how to assimilate past legacies critically. After being
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interrupted by the Cultural Revolution, guoxue has once again become a
matter of concern. (9)
Despite guoxue’s close ideological association with nativism, however, its
practitioners have been open to other kinds of learning, notably, the
“Western,” which has appeared to be a source of success in the modern
world, just as native learning has been essential to a recognisable Chinese
identity in that very same world. Maybe not all practitioners could live up
to Wang Guowei’s dictum (王國維) that “in learning, there is no new or old,
Chinese or Western, useless or useful.” (10) By the standards of their times,
even the “nativists” were cosmopolitan scholars who supported the impor-
tation of “Western” learning as necessary for national survival, and com-
bined the two kinds of learning in their scholarship. It may have been
Zhang Zhidong’s exhortation (張之洞) in the late 1890s of “Chinese learn-
ing for substance, Western learning for function” that initially informed the
first generation of guoxue advocates, but the rapidly advancing crisis of the
Qing gave it additional impetus in the fears it created of the total loss of
Chinese learning. This fear has been a driving force of guoxue, reinforcing
its ties to “nativism” despite the cosmopolitanism in the practise of guoxue
scholars. In a fundamental sense, guoxue has been a captive of its origins.
It was in nativist guise that guoxue discourse first appeared in Chinese
cultural and political discussion in the early twentieth century, as one
strand in an intensifying national consciousness. As with the kindred terms
guocui (國粹, national essence,) and guohun (國魂, national soul), guoxue
was one of the many terms of Chinese origin that were imported into Chi-
nese in the early twentieth century after having been recomposed and en-
dowed with a contemporary meaning in Japanese. (11) According to Martin
Bernal, one of the earliest references to guoxue was in a proposal by Liang
Qichao (梁啟超) in 1902 for the establishment of a National Studies Jour-
nal (國學報, Guoxue bao) “to preserve the national essence” in order “to
nourish citizens (國民, guomin).” (12) The term gained currency with the es-
tablishment in 1905 of a Society for the Preservation of National Essence
(國粹保存會, Guocui baocun hui) by a group of prominent intellectuals that
included Zhang Taiyan, Liu Shipei (劉師培), Huang Jie (黃節), Deng Shi (鄧實),
and the journal the society published from 1905 to 1911, the Guocui xue-
bao (國粹學報, The Journal of National Essence). By the time of the Repub-
lican revolution of 1911, guoxue discourse was firmly established in polit-
ical consciousness.
By the time it entered Chinese political discussion, the term guoxue in its
Japanese rendering, kokugaku (國學), already had a history of over two
centuries in political and historical discussion. Kokugaku had been born out
of critiques of the Tokugawa (德川幕府, 1603-1897) crisis of the late sev-
enteenth century, and reached its height in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, supplying the Meiji Restoration (明治維新) of 1868
with some of its slogans if not aspects of its ideology. Its target, ironically,
was neo-Confucianism, which was compromised in the eyes of its critics in
its service as the legitimating basis of the Bakufu (幕府), and appeared now
as a foreign intrusion that long had distorted the Japanese polity as it had
existed before the arrival of the foreign ideology around a thousand years
ago. Kokugaku scholars sought in pre-Confucian Japanese texts the nature
of this polity, and discovered it in the special nature of the imperial insti-
tution that distinguished Japan from China. Their answer was, therefore, to
return power to the emperor, and cultivate among the population the pris-
tine values of this pure Japan of the past so as to recreate this imperial
community. That was one of the fundamental goals of the Meiji Restora-
tion. In its unfolding over a period of nearly two centuries, the politics of
kokugaku changed from reform of the existing order (expressed in the Con-
fucian concept of zhongxing, literally “middle revival through moral regen-
eration”) to its repudiation in the name of an order that had existed in a
textual and imagined past (expressed once again with a term of Zhou Dy-
nasty origins, fugu (復古), “restoring antiquity,” taken very literally in the
Japanese context). The shift had significant consequences, as a distin-
guished historian of Tokugawa thought, Harry Harootunian, has written:
The intellectual history of this period is a transition between these
two metaphors of restoration. In calling for a regeneration of the
human order (chuko [中興, zhongxing]) it reminded men of the les-
sons of history; but a summons to restore antiquity (fukko [fugu])
liberated men from history into the understanding and flexible
world of myth. A restoration of the latter kind could only mean a
completely new political order, free from all those historical associ-
ations which chuko required as a condition of its success. (13)
Harootunian’s statement points to the implicit radicalism of kokugaku
discourse, which in its desire to restore an ancient order had to repudiate
the history that intervened between that order and the present. The liber-
ation of history also enabled the re-imagining and re-invention of the past
to be restored. Similar to the idea of revolution in later years, kokugaku
restorationism demanded release from history. Unlike the idea of revolu-
tion, which justified this demand in the name of an imagined future, koku-
gaku discourse rested its case on an imagined past.
During the Tokugawa period, these arguments served to assert a native
Japanese identity against the Confucianisation of Japan, and politically
strengthened the case for restoring power to the Emperor, who had been
relegated to the background of the Tokugawa order as a “principle” of pol-
itics. Following the Meiji Restoration, when the symbolic restoration of
power to the emperor was accompanied by the reconceptualisation of
Japan as a nation, kokugaku discourse turned to the articulation of Japan-
ese uniqueness and autonomy in the creation of a modern civilisation em-
bodied by the nation. While competing visions of Japan led to differences
among kokugaku writers, the discourse presupposed a unique Japanese
cultural identity, more often than not discovered in literature (especially
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language), religion (神道, Shinto), and even an intangible and invisible
Japanese emotional make-up, which also accounted for the unique em-
peror-centred political system. (14) It was also burdened with the task of
elucidating a Japanese national essence (kokusai [guocui]) that went back
to the beginnings of time and was essential to fostering national con-
sciousness and patriotism. Despite its new departures within a context of
nationalism that drew much of its grammar from the inspiration of Euro-
modernity, Meiji kokugaku discourse drew upon its Tokugawa antecedent
to demonstrate that “the rise of the Meiji state was….the result of nation-
alism, rather than nationalism as the product of the nation-state.” (15)
Kokugaku “central to discussions of Japan” from the 1890s was conjoined
in these years to kokusui, which also gained currency from the 1880s in re-
action to the seeming flooding of Japan by “Western” values and com-
modities. (16) The timing was quite fortuitous where guoxue discourse is
concerned. These were years in which the crisis of the Qing dynasty inten-
sified an emergent national consciousness, and fears of
national/cultural/racial extinction gripped a transitional generation of in-
tellectuals, mostly products of the imperial examination system but living
in a post-examination (1905) world. (17) They were also years in which Qing
intellectuals became familiar with Meiji Japan, and came to see it as a
model of modernisation despite its imperialism in East Asia. The idea of a
Japan that had modernised without giving up its essence no doubt im-
pressed some of those intellectuals. One contributor to Guocui xuebao
wrote that “as a country’s spirit lies in its national essence,” whether or not
guocui existed determined a country’s existence. And guocui itself was
nourished through its study. Through the slogan of “revere the Emperor and
oppose the foreigner” (尊王攘夷, zunwang rangyi, or 尊皇攘夷, sonno joi),
the Japanese had been able to summon the Yamato (大和) spirit (or 魂, hun,
soul) to mobilise the people, and now enjoyed its rewards. (18)
There was much in common in the basic assumptions of kokugaku dis-
course and discussions of guoxue in the decade before 1911. Most impor-
tant was the advocacy of return to a past that embodied the national
essence. Japanese thinkers located it in the pre-Confucian origin of the im-
perial line. Chinese thinkers of the late Qing located the national essence
in the late Zhou period, which had witnessed the flourishing of Chinese
learning (at least it was becoming Chinese, rather than Zhou, by this pe-
riod). Indeed, as Kang Youwei (康有為) had done with reference to Confu-
cianism in the 1890s, guocui writers viewed post-Qin thought as a distor-
tion of Zhou learning because of its service to imperial rule, which itself
had been contaminated by repeated foreign conquest of China. The latter
was “ruler-learning” (君學, junxue), not “national learning” (guoxue). (19) The
proper model for social and political organisation was to be found in pre-
Imperial texts of the Zhou dynasty. 
This accorded well with the politics of guocui writers who were involved
in the anti-Qing revolutionary movement. It also reaffirmed the impor-
tance of intellectuals in society as the guardians of texts and, by implica-
tion, of the national essence. As in the case of the kokugaku writers in
Japan, arguments for reviving antiquity had radical consequences in allow-
ing for the imagination of political order free from the constraints of lived
history. If this was conservatism, it was a conservatism that reaffirmed the
necessity of radical change even as it argued for the fundamental impor-
tance of the distant past to contemporary action – “revolution as restora-
tion” (or the reverse), as a recent study has put it. (20) Guocui xuebao writ-
ers were not particularly averse even to changing the “national learning” of
which they were guardians, as they believed that a “renaissance” much like
the European Renaissance was necessary in order for ancient learning to
serve the needs of the present. Indeed, writers for Guocui xuebao were
themselves heavily influenced by intellectual currents from Europe. Their
interpretations of the Chinese past drew heavily on the inspiration of con-
temporary theories of progress and social evolution, social (especially gen-
der) egalitarianism, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s ideas of social con-
tract. (21) It may not be too surprising that one of them, Liu Shipei, would
be the guiding light of Chinese anarchists in Tokyo after 1907. There was
some resonance between the guocui group’s rejection of “ruler-knowl-
edge” and Liu’s discovery of anarchism in the Chinese past. (22)
Guoxue in the late Qing context had two tasks. The first was to rescue
true learning (and hence the “national essence”) from its distortion under
imperial rule, especially foreign imperial despotism, which was directed
against the ruling dynasty. Second was to make sure that as new learning
was introduced to China from the “West,” it remained subservient to the
ethical demands of “national learning” that guaranteed the preservation of
a Chinese essence. The introductory essay to the journal by Huang Jie
stated that the preservation of guoxue was essential to national independ-
ence; just as it was possible for a nation to be enslaved by another, it was
also possible to become a slave-in-learning (學奴, xuenu), which would
also doom the possibility of national independence. (23) Another author, Xu
Shouwei, slightly modifying Zhang Zhidong’s famous dictum of “Chinese
learning for substance (ti), Western learning for function (yong),” stated
that “guocui was the study of spirit (精神, jingshen), Europeanisation 
(歐化, Ouhua) was the study of form.” (24) The same author stated in an-
other essay that each nation had its own “national spirit” (or soul, hun),
and the ultimate task of guoxue in China was the preservation of this soul,
the establishment of which went back to the Yellow Emperor (黃帝).
Though Guocui xuebao authors were ambivalent toward Confucianism be-
cause of its entanglement in “ruler’s learning,” this author also described
Confucius as the model practitioner of guoxue. (25)
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In my references in this discussion to Guocui xuebao authors, I do not
mean to suggest that these authors were all of one mind, or that discus-
sions of guoxue constituted a unified, homogeneous discourse. Rather, my
goal is to identify certain assumptions that these authors shared that gave
them something of a common intellectual and political identity. It is also
important to note that while Chinese authors were familiar with kokugaku
discourse, and shared with it a common language, that was by no means
the only discourse they drew upon for inspiration, as the discussions freely
referred to other instances of national discourse and national well-being
from ancient Rome to contemporary Italy, from the Renaissance in Europe
to the Monroe Doctrine in the United States (as its “soul”). (26)
It should be evident from this brief summarisation that guoxue discourse
was not only or primarily about learning. Guoxue as an intellectual field
was the product of an emergent national consciousness of the late Qing,
and the learning it advocated was intended to define and preserve a Chi-
nese national identity. Since guoxue writers repudiated the actual, living,
Chinese identity that was the legacy of history, they assumed responsibil-
ity for constructing such an identity. The identity “discovered” in ancient
texts was inevitably an identity invented in the present, since those texts
lent themselves to different readings and were to undergo a further trans-
formation in a “renaissance” rendering them relevant to the present. 
In other words, guoxue in its emergence was shaped by the nativist par-
adigm demanding that native learning, as imbedded in the texts and indi-
vidual exemplars of antiquity, serve as the foundation for, and a guardian
over, the learning that was necessary to establishing a modern nation. It
was also nativist in its identification of China with the Han nationality.
Guoxue from its origins meant something along the lines of “Han national
studies,” putting the emphasis on the ethno-national rather than the state
sense of the word “guo.” Whatever purpose it may have served in the cause
of Han nationalism, the identification was not necessarily positive in its
consequences for native learning. What earlier had been “the” learning was
now transformed into one learning among others, which needed to be de-
fended and preserved because of its function in defining national identity,
but for the same reason was restricted in appeal and relevance by its na-
tional belonging. 
Guoxue may be viewed from a global perspective as one response
among others to the contradictions created by nationalism under the
hegemonic circumstances of Euromodernity. Establishing a nation and
avoiding extinction (as Late Qing intellectuals saw it) required wholesale
importation of EuroAmerican learning, and the transformation of native
institutions to respond to the demands of nationalism. But this very re-
quirement immediately raised the question of what the nation itself
might be if society was to be remade in the image of models from the
outside. The society as it existed offered no answers, as it was viewed
widely as the problem requiring the solution. It made some sense, at least
from certain perspectives, to find the answer in some imagined antiquity
that necessarily rejected the history that had brought about the present,
but still provided some connection with the past. It is tempting to ob-
serve, indeed, that the contradiction was resolved in this case through the
“sinicisation” (中國化, Zhongguohua) of the ancient past. The solution ob-
viously had parallels in Japanese kokugaku, which played a direct part in
the Chinese formulation by providing a neighbourly example as well as a
new political language. But parallels may be found further afield in the
Slavophile responses to nation-building in nineteenth century Russia, the
re-writing of history in twentieth century Turkey, the return to a pre-Ot-
toman past in Arab nationalist historiography, or the search in Indian his-
toriography for an authentic native past in pre-Mughal times. Others
could be added to the list. Suffice it to say that in all these instances, the
search for a modern national identity in the textual traditions of remote
antiquity has been driven by an urge to overcome entrapment between
“the West” and the immediate past held accountable for the predicament
of the nation. (27)
While the content of guoxue has undergone significant transformation
over the past century, initial identification with a national essence or a
hallmark of national identity has remained its defining feature. New Cul-
ture radicals rejected important aspects of the past that National Essen-
tialists had sanctified, but their own version of guoxue underlined the
importance of the past to the contemporary project of modernity. A “sci-
entific” understanding of the past was necessary as the foundation for a
nation of intelligent citizens. Their cosmopolitanism was intended not to
negate the nation but to establish it on firmer modern grounds. The “Re-
organisation of the nation’s past” (整理國故, zhengli guogu), identified
with the names of Hu Shi and the iconoclastic historian Gu Jiegang 
(顧頡剛, 1893-1980), did not merely negate the inherited legacy. More
importantly, the very historiographical issues raised in the questioning of
the past opened up new horizons in the understanding of the nation and
what, therefore, should be the proper content of guoxue. In his pursuit of
conflicting representations of the past, imbedded in different versions of
past legends, a historian such as Gu achieved a new understanding of
China’s ethnic and cultural complexity and the need, therefore, to ques-
tion the very idea of “China” (Zhongguo) inherited from the past. (28) Gu
was not a Marxist, but he shared with the Marxists a conviction gather-
ing strength in the 1920s that history proper needed to be grounded in
society. Over the next decade, the Marxist turn in Chinese historiography
called for research into Chinese society, its social formations, and its ide-
ological productions. Marxist historians suffered from an unquestioning
theoretical and conceptual universalism, but there is little question as to
the significance of the issues they brought into Chinese history and
therefore into guoxue. 
The historicisation of the past would negate the central idea of a his-
tory-less national essence that justified guoxue discourse. But historici-
sation also opened up new locations of culture, or “other possible Chi-
nas,” that challenged the boundaries of guoxue. Individuals whose schol-
arly career had preceded and in part shaped the May Fourth period, and
who would leave a long-lasting influence on guoxue – the “four great tu-
tors,” Liang Qichao, Wang Guowei, Chen Yinke (陳寅恪), Zhao Yuanren 
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(趙元任) (29) – were not only adept at ancient texts, but in their scholarly
practise addressed issues of both China’s historical formation within a
larger world context and the complexities of Chinese society. Others
sought to bring together Chinese ancient civilisation and the civilisation
of ancient Greece, making them classicists rather than guoxue scholars.
But the overall trend was increasingly to locate Chinese identity in his-
torical and social processes that overflowed the boundaries of historical
China, rather than in textual traditions that were open to conflicting in-
terpretations. 
This tendency continued into the 1930s, but within the context of a
newly established revolutionary government that nevertheless sought le-
gitimation in the revival of native values. Kuomintang rule, following the
revolutionary upheaval of the 1920s that had brought it into power and
against continued Communist challenge, provided fertile grounds for na-
tivist ideas of order. The Kuomintang blamed these phenomena (as puta-
tive products of liberalism and Marxism) on cultural degeneration by ideas
imported from abroad, and sought an antidote to them in native values
and traditions. One significant consequence was to establish once again
values that pointed to the “essence” of being Chinese. The answer was
found in Confucian values, as established by Sun Yat-sen (孫中山). The first
two generations of guoxue scholars had stressed the importance of
thinkers of the late Zhou Dynasty other than Confucius, who was suspect
because of association of the Confucian tradition with state despotism.
And sure enough, when Yuan Shikai (袁世凱) briefly restored the monarchy
in 1916, Confucianism was revived, but now as state religion. The New Cul-
ture Movement, of course, made Confucius into the chief culprit for the
downfall of Chinese society. The 1930s witnessed the reversal of this trend,
when the Kuomintang leadership invented its own version of Sunist Con-
fucianism, and subsequently made Confucius into a national icon. The
Kuomintang turnabout encouraged the classics reading (讀經, dujing)
movement, which had originated in response to declining interest in the
classics following the abolition of the state examination system in 1905.
More important was the restoration of Confucian celebrations and cere-
monies, if under the national flag, and supervision of the political ideology
established by Sun Yat-sen. Ironically, while deploying Confucianism as le-
gitimation, the state was reluctant to pay for the upkeep of Confucian
temples across the country. (30)
State patronage of Confucianism in the 1930s no doubt contributed sig-
nificantly to the increasing identification of national essence, and there-
fore guoxue, with Confucianism, especially at the popular, public level. So
did the revitalisation of Confucian thinking out of the dialogue between
Chinese philosophers and “Western” philosophy, or at least the stimulus
from the latter, which would come to be labelled “new Confucianism” in
subsequent years. Their readings of Confucianism as philosophy and Chi-
nese cultural endowment animate discussion to this day, and have played
a major part in the most recent revival of Confucianism since the late
1970s, especially among intellectuals but extending to the general public
as well. A 1958 declaration (為中國文化敬告世界人士宣言, wei Zhongguo
wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan) by this new generation of philoso-
phers made Confucian values into formative constituents of Chinese na-
tional identity and the bulwark of Chinese society – cultural DNA, so to
speak. At the same time, the declaration tacitly acknowledged the retreat
of Confucian values into a more restricted ethical/religious realm in its
recognition of the necessity of democracy and science and technology as
conditions of modern existence. This seeming de-politicisation of Confu-
cianism did not preclude, needless to say, state intervention in its propa-
gation. (31)
The revitalisation of Confucianism in the 1930s accompanied (and per-
haps benefited from) a general preoccupation, cutting across political divi-
sions, with making things Chinese (中國化, Zhongguohua). The idea is asso-
ciated most closely with Mao Zedong’s “making Marxism Chinese” (馬克思
主義的中國化, Makesi zhuyide Zhongguohua), which sought to translate
Marxism into not only a Chinese but also a popular Chinese idiom. But it
was also important in academia in calls for “making Chinese” the disci-
plines that were only then in the process of being introduced into the uni-
versities. It was present in the calls for a “third culture” (第三種文化, di san
zhong wenhua) that, as with the idea of Zhongguohua in general, presup-
posed a “national character in learning.” (32) This, of course, also further
deepened the question of what constituted “Chineseness.” (33)
These issues of the 1930s, much more than those of the May Fourth pe-
riod, set the stage for discussions of Chineseness, Confucianism, and
guoxue since the 1980s. There were discussions earlier in the late 1950s,
no doubt, but the adverse political implications of guoxue rendered it po-
litically undesirable and intellectually suspect. The insistent historicization
of the past, this time a Marxist historicization, moreover, deprived the sub-
ject-matter of guoxue of all but historical significance. The dehistoricisa-
tion of the past was arguably a precondition of the re-emergence of the
ideas associated with guoxue since the 1980s. 
Indeed, a historical perspective on guoxue suggests that in addition to
the two paradigms (primarily spatial) informed by nativism and cos-
mopolitanism, our understanding would benefit from recognition of his-
toricism and essentialism as two further paradigmatic dimensions. The in-
terplay of these paradigms opens up the possibility of diverse understand-
ings of guoxue, from exclusive understandings that at the extreme restrict
it to Confucianism, or maybe Daoism and Confucianism, as quintessen-
tially Chinese philosophies and value-systems, to open-ended understand-
ings as an account of the historical formation of Chinese society, with its
own changing historical characteristics. 
This breadth of coverage, with all the intellectual and ideological differences
it contains, may have been one reason for the difficulties guoxue faced as a
realm of critical knowledge, and possibly encouraged its identification with is-
sues of national essence, which are driven more by conviction (and ideologi-
cal work by the state and intellectual elite) than by evidence of the spatial
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and temporal homogeneity of Chinese people around the world. Chineseness,
the product of history, is rendered in the essentialist perspective into the pro-
ducer of history. Likewise, guoxue, a product of modern national conscious-
ness, is made into its bedrock to testify to the antiquity of the nation.
It is possible, however, that guoxue as a realm of learning also suffered
from the reorganisation of learning in the process of building a higher ed-
ucation system after Euromodern models. For one thing, the appropriation
of guoxue for nationalism also made it into merely a “national” form of
learning, the property of one nation that is irrelevant to others. As I noted
above, what had been “the” learning in the past was rendered into one
learning among others with only marginal claims in an educational system
that was presumably founded upon universalist assumptions. In such a
context, guoxue itself becomes subject to the disciplinary requirements of
modern academia. According to Tze-ki Hon, the prominent intellectual
(and later anarchist) Liu Shipei in one of his contributions to Guocui xue-
bao “examined more than a dozen types of learning that supposedly ap-
peared in Pre-Qin China, including psychology, ethics, logic, sociology, re-
ligion, law, mathematics, military education, natural science and fine
arts.” (34) In ensuing years, with the establishment of the modern disciplines
in Chinese universities, guoxue itself, when it existed as an academic unit,
existed as one among many others that studied the Chinese past, now
with the authority of modern science and academic division of labour (for
example, the short-lived Tsinghua Institute of Chinese Classics, now the
model for Humanities at the University). (35) One prominent historian edu-
cated abroad went so far as to declare that if the past was to be under-
stood, guoxue should be abolished. (36) In other words, in addition to being
ideologically suspect in the eyes of progressives in academia, guoxue also
suffered from a diffuseness of subject-matter (or, conversely, insistence on
a holistic understanding of it) that clashed with the disciplinary require-
ments of the Euromodern organisation of learning.
Guoxue also retreated with advances in the knowledge of the past
brought about by new disciplines, including the very practise of guoxue. Ar-
chaeology was one discipline with revolutionary implications for rewriting
the past. A wilful resistance to archaeological evidence in the name of the
sanctity of the written classics, as in the case of Zhang Taiyan, could not
be sustained except as the eccentricity of a brilliant maverick. (37) But the
diffusion of guoxue concerns across academic disciplines also meant that
where guoxue had a disciplinary identity, the identity was conditioned by
methodological boundaries of philological and textual research. From an
intellectual perspective, this may be similar to the transformation of sinol-
ogy (or other Orientalisms) in EuroAmerican universities from the analysis
of all aspects of entire civilisations to narrow (and largely marginalised)
purveyors of philological and textual research. Indeed, some scholars have
described guoxue as a Chinese version of foreign sinology, richer than the
latter by virtue of national affinity to the past, but otherwise relegated to
a similarly restricted domain. Aside from problems of ideology, intellectual
boundaries, and methods, recognition of the disciplinary predicament of
guoxue is important in assessing its current possibilities and the challenges
it faces in a new context of global modernity. 
Guoxue/global modernity
Cheng Gang and Cao Li have observed shrewdly that there has been a
shift in recent years in both the advocacy of guoxue and its intellectual en-
vironment. They have argued that over the years, guoxue has been nour-
ished by sense of “lack” – a sense that China lacked the integrated whole-
ness of Western society, as well as a feeling that Chinese culture lacks a
centre, or that the centre is perpetually receding. (38) This sense of lack has
been replaced since the 1990s with a newfound sense of success in moder-
nity. It is currently a sense of confidence that drives the guoxue revival.
The international environment likewise has changed. Postmodernism has
called into question the temporalities of modernisation, so that there is
now no clear distinction between what is conservative or progressive. It
has also encouraged a relativism that enables the recognition of value in
different thought and value systems, and rejects imposing on weaker soci-
eties the value standards of the powerful. The importation of these ideas
to China has also enabled renewed confidence in the assertion of Chinese
difference. (39)
These are important insights. And yet, we must remember not to confuse
intellectuals’ postmodernism with the universal or general acceptance of
relativistic arguments. These years have also seen the hardening of cultural
boundaries in the upsurge of cultural nationalism that inspired Huntington.
The increased recognition of difference has liberated many from unipolar
modes of thinking, but it has also brought increased friction, as ethnic and
cultural boundaries are hardened with the reification of culture and as-
sumptions of homogeneity within national or ethnic boundaries – by lib-
eral multiculturalism on the one side, and an elevated ethnic, racial, and re-
ligious consciousness among more conservative populations. The celebra-
tion of difference, accompanied by deadly conflict over difference on a
daily basis, is a pervasive feature of global modernity. Difference is not just
an intellectual question; it is also political and therefore entangled in ques-
tions of power and hegemony.
I think this context is of necessity the point of departure for any contem-
porary consideration of the domain and tasks of guoxue. Before I state my
understanding, let me make two observations that underlie my under-
standing. What is not in question is whether or not guoxue is a legitimate
public/intellectual and academic domain. That question has already been
answered by the enthusiastic response in both academia and among the
public to the call of guoxue. While the advocacy of guoxue raises both cul-
tural and political issues that call for critical attention, there is obviously
nothing wrong or automatically regressive in the appreciation of past lega-
cies in China or elsewhere; nor is there any self-evident justification for po-
litical policing of what legacies may be admissible – unless, of course, we
wish to advocate thought control of one kind or another. 
It does not follow, however, that guoxue is therefore a universal, or the
most fundamental, cultural force in contemporary Chinese lives, which are
caught up in the material and cultural commodity circulation of global
capitalism. Guoxue may currently serve a number of needs, from the po-
litical to the cultural, spiritual, and intellectual. But beyond these needs is
the very status of guoxue itself in a new context of globalised commodity
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culture. Indeed, while guoxue is open to use as an antidote to the cultural
commodities in global circulation, it is itself caught up in the gravitational
field of the latter, not just in public but also in academic life. In other
words, guoxue itself is available as a commodity for cultural consumption
at many levels. This may make it more difficult to define than ever be-
fore. (40) At the same time, it may also suggest a point of departure in sort-
ing out the tasks of guoxue as a critical undertaking at this juncture: ex-
plaining how this situation has come about. 
Critical understanding of guoxue demands a critical understanding of the
history of guoxue in relation to other ways of understanding the past. It is
important to understand why guoxue has been controversial over the
years. As with other civilisational claims of the contemporary world – from
Christian to Moslem to Hindu to proliferating indigenous claims, among
many others – the resurgence of the learning associated with guoxue rep-
resents at one level a release from the hegemony of a Eurocentric moder-
nity. The denial of a centre to modernity, however, presents its own
predicament: a loss of common standards of what is and is not appropriate
knowledge. The loss of a commonly shared critical standard also makes it
easier to subject learning to the claims of ideology, whether of nations,
classes, or other social groups. Guoxue should be a point of departure for
new kinds of investigation: of its own past, as well as of emergent practices
of national learning globally. The rendering of guoxue into a marker of na-
tional identity severely limits its epistemological claims by making them
into functions of national identity. Guoxue needs also to explore the
supranational possibilities of varieties of national learning. Those who have
pushed the frontiers of guoxue in the past have done so through openness
to cultural complexity within China, and to global perspectives on Chinese
society – both in the scope of their investigations and in their method-
ological assumptions. (41) In post-revolutionary China, the history of guoxue
includes the history of the revolution, and needs to be understood in that
context. It also includes national struggles with Eurocentric hegemony,
which now have been replaced with the ideological multi-polarity of global
modernity. That, too, is part of its constitution. (42)
Secondly, after a century of preoccupation with Euro/American hege-
mony, it makes sense to adopt a more global perspective on cultural com-
parison than that implied by Chinese/Western binarism, which also sug-
gests that the only desirable response to Eurocentrism is Sinocentrism. In-
deed, if the goal is truly to discover what may be unique to Chinese society
in terms of values, comparison with the modern “West” hardly provides a
sufficient basis. This preoccupation with Euro/America, in China as in other
like societies, is a major force in perpetuating Eurocentrism. There is little
political or academic incentive in pursuing questions of learning through
comparison between societies of the South, as well as indigenous soci-
eties, but this in fact would be a major contribution of a guoxue genuinely
free of Euro/American intellectual hegemony. (43) While it may seem de-
grading to the more civilisation-minded to compare Confucian or Daoist
ideas to the outlook of indigenous peoples, the holistic ecological outlook
implicit in such ideas as tianren heyi (天人合一, unity of heaven and hu-
mans) or tian/di/ren (天地人, heaven/earth/human), deemed to be funda-
mental to a Chinese value-system, are ideas that are quite commonly
found in indigenous philosophies. There is much of human significance to
be gained from placing post-Euromodern readings of Confucian, Daoist, or
Buddhist values within the context of post-Enlightenment critical indi-
genism that shares the common goal of revitalising holistic views of hu-
mans, society, and nature to remedy the deficiencies of advanced capital-
ism and its seemingly inexorable “creative destruction” of social harmony
and ecological well-being. (44)
Finally, a word about academic function. If Chinese learning has already
been fragmented into disciplines, guoxue may perform an important task
in formulating projects that cut across disciplinary and area divisions. This
may sound like going back to older sinological models, but it is not. The
role to be assumed here is not of container but of intermediary; not to dis-
solve the disciplines into Chinese studies but to weave Chinese studies on
an ongoing basis out of disciplinary findings. The proper analogy here is
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40. Hence a senior Chinese scholar of philosophy and religion at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
Yu Dunkang, complains that it is impossible to say what guoxue should be about, or what culture it is
supposed to revive, because everyone seems to have their favourite choice; in the end, everything Chi-
nese is guoxue. See the interview in “Guoxue yuantou” (Sources of guoxue), in Liang Chu, Guoxue fang-
tan: Guangming ribao guoxue zhuankan jingxuan (Conversation visits on guoxue: Selections from
Guangming Daily special edition on guoxue), Beijing, Guangming Daily Publishers, 2008, pp. 105-112,
p. 106. Confucianism and Daoism now also appear in Chinese societies in a self-help New Age guise.
See, for example, Fu Peirong, Guoxuede tiankong (The boundless space of guoxue), Xi’an, Shaanxi Nor-
mal University Press, 2009, and most famous of all, the works of the television Confucian star, Yu Dan.
The attribution of Eastern Asian economic success to the cultural legacies of Chinese, Korean, and
Japanese societies, especially Confucianism, is no doubt largely responsible for the stimulation of in-
terest in guoxue as well. Guoxue, of course, is also conceived by some as a means to promote a more
ethical and socially conscious approach to business. See, Dong Zizhu, Yu qiyezhe liao Guoxue (Guoxue
for entrepreneurs), Wuhan, Changjiang Arts and Literature Publishers, 2008. 
41. For anthropological perspectives on how comparative and popular culture studies may contribute to
guoxue, see “Laizi renleixuede shengyin”(Voices from anthropology), in Liang Chu, Guoxue fangtan, op.
cit., pp. 236-250, pp. 241-242. Anthropologists and cultural studies scholars are more in the tradition
of Gu Jiegang (the “new tradition,” xin chuantong) in their emphases on popular culture and closer at-
tention to non-Han ethnic groups. According to an anthropologist such as Wang Mingming, guoxue in
turn may help anthropology overcome domination by concepts of European cultural origin (and hence
help indigenise [bentuhua] anthropology). 
42. These concerns have been expressed by Chinese scholars of an earlier generation such as Zhang Dain-
ian and Tang Yijie, who have also stressed the importance of recent history to a post-socialist guoxue.
See, Zhang Dainian, “Shuo ‘guoxue,’”(On ‘guoxue’), in Hu, Guoxue dashi, op. cit., pp. 161-163, p. 163.
See also the discussions by Tang Yijie, Ren Jiyu, et al., “Guoxue yu ershiyi shiji”(Guoxue and the twenty-
first century), in Liang Chu, Guoxue fangtan: Guangming ribao guoxue zhuankan jingxuan, op. cit., pp.
178-183. Yu Dunkang, whom I cited above for his complaints about the diffuseness of guoxue and
what it is expected to revive, writes that “guoxue is culture, culture is not something on a piece of
paper, but the way of life of the Chinese people, rooted deep in the traditions that live on in the hearts
of the people” (p. 181). 
43. The importance of inter-cultural dialogue is recognised by scholars such as Liu Dong, but it has been
restricted so far mostly to “Chinese-Western” dialogue. Overcoming this binarism, and the reification
of both China and the West, is a precondition for critical opening up of guoxue. For Liu Dong, see Chang
Gang and Cao Li, “Wenhua minzu zhuyi yu wenhua shijie zhuyi,” op. cit., pp. 315-317. Wang Mingming
is one scholar who has been critical of the “progressivism” (jinbu zhuyi) that encourages comparison
with the advanced and ignores the rest of the world (such as Africa). See his comments in Liang Chu,
Guoxue fangtan, op. cit., p. 250.
44. To my knowledge, Tu Wei-ming is the only scholar of Confucianism who has pointed to this connec-
tion. See, Tu, “Beyond the Enlightenment Mentality,” in Mary Tucker and John Berthrong, Confucianism
and Ecology: The Interrelation of Heaven, Earth and Humans, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Cen-
ter for the Study of World Religions, 1998, pp. 3-21, p. 8. The philosophical existence of these values
does not mean that they necessarily guide behaviour, as in the case of “the unity of heaven and hu-
mans,” for instance, which is overwhelmed by the developmentalism that guides official thinking and
popular sentiment – another challenge for guoxue scholarship!
45. Chinese scholars pointed to this problem of parochialisation in the 1930s as a caution against argu-
ments to make learning Chinese. See, Ji, “Mantan xueshu Zhongguohua wenti,” op. cit. There are pro-
liferating examples of efforts to articulate Confucianism and Daoism to contemporary problems, most
prominently ecological problems. See, N. J. Girardot, James Miller, and Liu Xiaogan (ed.), Daoism and
Ecology, Cambridge, MA, Harvard Divinity School Center for the Study of World Religions, 2001, and,
Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Berthrong (ed.), Confucianism and Ecology. For a more down-to-earth
deployment of guoxue issues in contemporary intellectual discussions, see the discussion of modernity
in Wang Hui, “Scientific Worldview, Culture Debates, and the Reclassification of Knowledge in Twenti-
eth Century China,” in which Wang discusses Zhang Taiyan with reference to issues of modernism and
anti-modernism (Boundary 2, vol. 35, no. 2, Summer 2008, pp. 125-155). Indeed, there long has been
a blurring of the inside/outside distinction in the discussion of guoxue issues, and discussions outside
of the People’s Republic of China (not just other Chinese societies) may well have played a part in
stimulating discussions in the PRC. The case of guoxue is the latest example of the part played by the
transnational circulation of ideas (Buddhist to Christian to Euromodern) in the shaping of imperial
scholarship. I am grateful to Samuel Cheung for reminding me of this important point. For interesting
discussions of this problem, see Zhu Weizheng, “Han learning and Western learning in the eighteenth
century,” in Zhu Weizheng, Coming out of the Middle Ages: Comparative Reflections on China and the
West, tr. and ed. by Ruth Hayhoe, Armonk, NY, ME Sharpe, 1990, pp. 113-142; and Lionel M. Jensen,
Manufacturing Confucianism: Chinese Traditions and Universal Civilization, Durham, NC, Duke Univer-
sity Press, 1997. Zhu’s article is also noteworthy for stressing the relationship between transnational
flows and the regionalising of imperial scholarship.
Special feature
with “national studies” elsewhere, which take the nation as a point of de-
parture to inquire critically into both its internal constitution and its place
in the world. This, too, requires a guoxue that is not shrunk into a marginal
discipline but is in constant exchange with other disciplines – and not just
the humanities. (45)
Guoxue in China faces challenges similar to those of other national/civil-
isational/ indigenous legacies of learning that currently demand a hearing
as constituents of global modernity. Dialogue with these various legacies,
including the Euro/American, is essential to assessing its own particulari-
ties among different value and knowledge systems. It is also a necessity for
overcoming a parochial incarceration in nationalist ideology in favour of a
more universalistic appreciation of China’s contribution to the global
storehouse of ideas and values.
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